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Introduction
Recent events in Asia and elsewhere 1 have served to reemphasize the importance of deposit insurance programs and related government guarantees of the banking system. While the presence of such insurance and guarantees has probably averted open bank runs in a number of economies, the financial crises in Asia and in other parts of the world are stark illustrations of the moral hazard problems created by deposit insurance schemes. Nor are these problems associated with the presence of explicit deposit insurance alone: they also arise when a government decides that some set of banks is "too big to fail 2 ".
No doubt the issue that has received the most attention in discussions of deposit insurance is how it should be priced. Many have argued that it is important, for example, that deposit insurance is priced in an actuarially fair manner, 3 for if it is not, bank incentives are alleged to be distorted. Others have argued that the use of risk-based deposit insurance premia can be a powerful tool for alleviating moral hazard problems [Kane (1989) ]. And, whether or not deposit insurance premia reflect risk, many believe that deposit insurance should not be priced in a way that results in substantial subsidies to banks.
Finally, it is widely accepted that when government deposit insurance systems experience sufficiently large losses, this is a signal that "something is wrong". All of this raises the obvious issue of the appropriate design and pricing of deposit insurance.
We revisit these issues in a model that brings the general equilibrium consequences of deposit insurance programs to the forefront. We begin by considering a system where bank deposits are 100 percent insured, and where a flat rate deposit insurance premium is imposed on banks. 4 Banks take 1 See Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) for an extensive discussion of 86 banking crises in a variety of countries since 1974. 2 For example, the Japanese Ministry of Finance stated in 1996 that none of the nation's 21 largest banks would be permitted to fail. 3 Although some have questioned the feasibility of such pricing: see Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) and the subsequent treatment of this issue by Freixas and Rochet (1996) . 4 There is great variation across deposit insurance systems in different nations, with some offering virtually unlimited coverage, and some offering none at all. The EC for example, has adopted a common system under which deposits are insured up to a maximum of about $25,000, subject to a 10 percent coinsurance clause. However, as a practical matter, even when 100 percent deposit insurance is not explicitly provided, it is implicitly provided when large banks are treated as "too big to fail." And, when a banking system is highly concentrated with a relatively small number of large banks, this policy effectively constitutes complete insurance coverage for the system. Such insured deposits and make loans to agents who have a choice of two investment projects. Banks-and society-care which projects are undertaken, and different projects imply different default risks on loans.
Borrower's project choices can be observed only by bearing a cost: this introduces a moral hazard problem associated with bank lending. In addition, project returns can be observed only at some cost by outsiders: this gives rise to a conventional costly state verification (CSV) problem in lending.
Therefore, our model of the banking firm allows for two forms of moral hazard: ex post moral hazard due to costly state verification, and ex ante moral hazard due to the possibility of inappropriate investment decisions by borrowers. 5 Banks can take various actions to address the problem of moral hazard, and which actions they take in turn affect the probability of bank failure. This aspect of the model gives rise to a moral hazard problem between banks and a (governmental) deposit insurer, which is related to-but different from-the moral hazard problem already present between banks and borrowers.
As will be shown, in a partial equilibrium context 6 the pricing of deposit insurance does affect the incentives of banks to address problems of moral hazard in this model. Thus, if we were to confine our analysis to partial equilibrium, we would conclude that the pricing of deposit insurance matters for the severity of moral hazard problems. When the same issues are analyzed in a general equilibrium context, however, matters are substantially different. For instance, our analysis suggests that-in a general equilibrium framework-the single most important issues about deposit insurance system design are the following: how are any shortfalls or surpluses in FDIC revenue dealt with, and how large are these shortfalls or surpluses?
defacto system-wide coverage has figured prominently in recent banking problems (Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 1998) . 5 The first moral hazard problem is quite standard and should require no further explanation. The second is somewhat less standard in the literature and merits some comment. We adopt a formulation where a misallocation of funds by borrowers allows them to engage in excess consumption of "perks." This moral hazard problem, if uncontrolled, results in a transfer of income from banks to firm owners, and it also allows firm owners to reallocate assets for their own personal consumption. Naturally this reallocation is associated with a distortion of firm investments that acts to the detriment of creditors. It is also socially detrimental, since it would typically be better to allow firm owners to take income directly. This moral hazard problem therefore has two related dimensions: a misallocation of investment, and a socially inefficient diversion of funds. As argued by Akerlof and Romer (1993) , both types of moral hazard are often observed in practice, and we believe that this model captures both in a parsimonious way. 6 In particular, if the rate of interest on deposits is taken as given.
innocuous one possible. 7 Under this financing scheme, and when the FDIC levies flat-rate deposit insurance premia on banks, we show that "small" variations in FDIC policy (in practice these might be fairly large) are generically irrelevant to any aspect of an equilibrium that matters for welfare. In particular, neither deposit insurance premia, nor the magnitude of FDIC losses matters to any agent.
Modest changes in policy, therefore, have no necessary implications for the severity of moral hazard problems in banking.
Why should this be the case? As we show, variations in FDIC policy parameters affect real rates of interest on deposits. The higher is the deposit insurance premium, the lower is the (real) deposit rate.
However, changes in deposit insurance premia may simply imply changes in rates of interest on deposits that leave banks' costs of funds unaltered under each possible lending strategy. As a result, optimal bank lending strategies-and expected bank profits-are not affected by changes in deposit insurance premia.
Similarly, higher deposit insurance premia imply lower FDIC losses and lower lump-sum taxes on depositors. But these lower taxes/losses might simply offset the consequences of lower rates of interest on deposits. If this is the case, there will be no net welfare changes caused by varying deposit insurance premia, and it is similarly irrelevant how large are the FDIC's losses. Moreover, we show that this reasoning applies essentially intact when we leave the realm of flat rate deposit insurance premia, and allow deposit insurance premia to depend on banks' portfolio choices.
To the extent that the design of the deposit insurance system does matter, what turns out to be important is the magnitude of FDIC (expected) losses, in discounted present value terms. When FDIC losses are below some critical level, banks will take one possible course of action to deal with moral hazard problems. When FDIC losses are above this level, they will take another. However, all that matters, economically speaking, is whether FDIC losses are below or above the critical level.
One can ask the question, is it "good" for FDIC loss levels to be low? While we have no general results on this point, we do compute numerical examples where, in fact, low levels of FDIC losses are 7 Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2000) describe an alternative method of making up FDIC losses that renders all "bad" in the following sense. Equilibrium welfare levels of all agents could be improved if FDIC losses were increased so that they were above the critical level we mentioned. Thus, there is no general presumption in favor of low FDIC losses. Moreover, actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance may well be a suboptimal policy, as it is in the examples mentioned, because it leads FDIC losses to be low.
Our other results concern the potential for multiplicity of equilibria. We describe conditions under which an economy may have two equilibria. These equilibria differ according to the way in which banks address moral hazard problems. They also yield different rates of interest on loans and deposits, and they imply different rates of bank failure and (possibly) different loss levels for the FDIC. We show that when two equilibria exist, they can often be Pareto ranked. Thus it is quite possible for an economy to end up in a Pareto inferior equilibrium. Moreover, the potential for multiple equilibria to exist may well depend on the policy choices made by the FDIC. We illustrate by example how this can occur.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the environment and the deposit insurance system. Section II undertakes a partial equilibrium analysis of bank behavior, while section III describes a full general equilibrium. Section IV gives some numerical examples, and Section V concludes.
I. The Model
We consider a two-period model populated by a continuum of agents with unit mass. Agents belong to three groups: borrowers (or firms), bankers (or potential bankers), and depositors. There is also a government operated deposit insurance system (the FDIC). We now describe each set of agents.
A. Firms
Borrowers (firms) are a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the population. All borrowers are endowed with two investment projects, although at most one of the projects can be operated. A project that is activated aspects of deposit insurance design totally irrelevant.
in the first period yields a random gross return of z per unit invested, in period 2. For both projects
Projects differ on two dimensions: their scale of operation, and their probability distributions of returns. Type 1 projects require q 1 > 1 units of period one resources ("funds") to operate. We assume that all projects are indivisible, so that a type 1 project requires an investment of exactly q 1 units. For a type 1 project that is operated at time 1, the probability of receiving a return no greater than z % is prob ( ) ( ) zzGz ≤= %% . Let g(z) denote the pdf of this distribution, and assume that ( ) ( ) 00, gzzz >∀∈ .
We will often assume that g is (almost) everywhere differentiable, and we let 1 z denote the expected gross return, per unit invested. Project returns are independently and identically distributed across agents.
In order to operate project 2, a firm requires q 2 units of first period funds, with q 2 ∈(1, q 1 ). These projects are again indivisible, and if project 2 is funded, prob ( ) ( ) zzFz ≤= %% . Let f denote the pdf of this distribution, assume that ( ) ( )
00, fzzz >∀∈
, and let 2 z denote the expected gross return on investments in project 2. As before, we will typically assume that f is (almost) everywhere differentiable, and we assume that project return realizations are iid across firms.
To fix ideas, let the probability distribution of returns on project 1 display first order stochastic dominance over the distribution of returns on project 2. Thus (a.1)
It follows that 1 z > 2 z . Thus, project 1 is, on average, more productive than project 2 (not inclusive of monitoring costs), but it requires more resources to operate.
As indicated previously, a borrower could in principle operate either project 1 or project 2. It is not possible to operate both projects, or convex combinations of both projects. Such assumptions are common in models with moral hazard and costly state verification.
Firms have no first or second period funds endowment. They therefore require external funding to operate an investment project. If no project is operated, we assume that borrowers can engage in some other activity that yields the exogenously given utility level u .
Information
The provision of external finance is subject to two potential informational asymmetries: a moral hazard problem and a costly state verification problem. A moral hazard problem arises because a borrower's choice of project is unobservable to a lender in the absence of some other action on the lender's part. A costly state verification (CSV) problem [Townsend (1979) , Diamond (1984) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) , Williamson (1986 Williamson ( , 1987 ] arises because, for either type of project, the random return z can be freely observed only by the project owner. For certain other agents the project return can be observed, ex post, if a fixed amount of effort, denoted by γ, is expended in period 2. Also, we will allow for the possibility that only some agents can engage in state verification, as described below.
The moral hazard problem in the model works as follows. Since a lender does not observe a borrower's choice of investment project ex ante, a borrower who receives q 1 units of external funding in period 1 could operate project 2, and divert q 1 -q 2 units to other uses. To fix ideas, we assume that diverted funds yield "perks" to firm owners. A firm owner who has a second period income of y and who has expended q 1 -q 2 units of funds on "perks" has the utility level y + δ (q 1 -q 2 ). The parameter δ describes how close a substitute "perks" are for other income. We assume that δ ∈ (0, 1], and that 2 z δ > .
8, 9
While only a borrower knows his project choice ex ante, this choice can be ascertained ex post by a lender by engaging in interim monitoring. In particular, after an investment has occurred but before 8 This "diversion of funds" formulation loosely follows Gertler and Rogoff (1990) . Since δ ≤ 1, expenditures on "perks" do not generate greater utility than the receipt of an equivalent amount of income. We impose $ z2 > δ so that the diversion of funds is socially inefficient. 9 The purpose of introducing a CSV problem is that it creates some presumption that the debt contracts entered into by commercial banks are not an inferior contractual form, so long as we abstract from stochastic monitoring. The purpose of introducing moral hazard is to permit an investigation of how FDIC behavior affects the incentives of banks to address problems of moral hazard. The manner in which banks deal with moral hazard problems in lending will generally affect the costs faced by a deposit insurer. Thus the moral hazard problem in lending generates its own problem of moral hazard between banks and the government.
the project return is realized, a lender can learn the true project choice by expending λ units of effort. At this point, if the borrower has diverted funds, the lender can call the loan and liquidate the project.
Projects of type j have the liquidation value L j . We assume that interim monitoring can be done stochastically. However, any "perks" consumption generated by the diversion of funds occurs before a project can be liquidated.
10
Interim monitoring is one device by which a lender can attempt to control the moral hazard problem. A second device is also available. In particular, we assume that each borrower can deal with only a single lender, so that that lender can control the quantity of funds the borrower receives. 11 Thus, by restricting the quantity of funds loaned to q 2 , a lender can always prevent a diversion of funds.
B. Bankers
Agents with the ability to form banks constitute a fraction β ∈(0,1) of the population. Each potential banker is endowed with one unit of first period funds, along with some effort that can be expended on interim and ex post monitoring. In order to actuate the ability to monitor (perhaps by making an investment), a potential banker must invest one unit of funds in the first period. This assumption implies that each active bank must obtain external deposits to lend.
Our assumptions on investment returns imply that there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy. Of course, to create a role for deposit insurance, it is necessary to allow for the possibility that any bank might fail. To accomplish this, we assume that any bank can make only a finite number of loans. Here, to simplify matters, we assume that each bank deals with only a single borrower.
12
Bankers are assumed to be risk neutral, and to care only about second period income (consumption) and effort expended on monitoring. If y denotes second period income and e I (e F ) denotes effort expenditure on interim (final) monitoring, then a banker's utility is y -λe I -γe F . e I (e F ) ∈ {0, 1}, 10 There would be only minor differences in the analysis if either assumption was altered. 11 This assumption is also common in models with informational asymmetries. 12 "One bank -one borrower" assumptions are not uncommon; see, for instance, John, John and Saunders (1994) , Mailath and Mester (1994) , Berlin, John, and Saunders (1996), or Santos (1999) . We also note that the one bank -one borrower assumption is made only for simplicity. In practice one might imagine a bank dealing with several borrowers concentrated in a single geographic area or industry so that investment returns received by its borrowers are correlated.
and e I (e F ) = 0 (1) implies that interim (ex post) monitoring did not (did) occur. Finally, as the phrase "potential banker" indicates, each potential banker need not run a bank. A potential banker who is not active in banking simply saves his single unit of funds, in effect becoming a depositor. We impose the assumption β ≥ α, so that it is at least possible that every potential borrower can gain access to a bank.
C. Depositors
The remainder of the population, having mass 1-α -β, is depositors. All depositors are endowed with one unit of funds when young, and depositors care only about second period consumption.
Thus, depositors inelastically supply one unit of funds, per capita, in the initial period.
Depositors are risk averse, so they desire deposit insurance. Given our assumptions on the inability of banks to diversify, this insurance is provided by the FDIC. Parenthetically, note that our assumption that q 2 > 1 means that any firm requires more funds than a single saver could provide even absent any investment in monitoring capacity. Familiar arguments [Diamond (1984) , Williamson (1986)] then imply the desirability of having savings be intermediated, in order to eliminate the duplication of monitoring effort. 
Deposits
Prior to describing deposit insurance we need to describe the operation of deposit markets. In the first period all depositors-as well as potential bankers not operating banks-make a deposit with active banks. Banks promise to pay the gross market rate of return r, per unit deposited, if this is feasible.
Banks lending to sufficiently successful borrowers will be able to honor their commitments. However, for banks who lend to borrowers experiencing low returns, it will be infeasible to pay off depositors. In this case the bank fails and the FDIC pays off depositors. We now describe FDIC behavior.
13 Parenthetically, why do we assume that agents cannot effectively insure their own deposits by diversifying their deposits across a large number of banks? The answer is that , if agents held deposits with many banks, each agent would have to monitor many banks. The result would be a socially wasteful duplication of monitoring activity. It is better to have a single agent who provides deposit insurance. Of course this point is very similar to that made by Townsend (1983) in his theory of intermediated structures. Why do we assume that the government provides deposit insurance, rather than a private entity? For a private insurer, deposit insurance would have to be priced in an actuarially fair manner. As we will show, under some methods for financing deposit insurance losses, welfare can be increased if the deposit insurance system can run losses. Thus it is natural here to allow for government provision of deposit insurance.
D. The Deposit Insurer (FDIC)
The risk aversion of depositors renders deposit insurance valuable. The fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty implies that it is feasible for the FDIC to fully insure depositors. The FDIC then behaves as follows. In period one the FDIC imposes a flat rate deposit insurance premium of t per unit lent on each active bank. 14 It also collects some other revenue, which we describe below.
In period two, some banks pay r per unit deposited, and some do not. The FDIC takes no action with respect to the former. However, for the latter, "failed banks", the FDIC takes over the bank, liquidates its assets, and uses the proceeds to pay depositors. Like other agents, the FDIC cannot freely observe the assets of a failed bank. Thus the action of taking over a bank requires that the FDIC engage in costly ex post state verification to ascertain the value of bank assets. To conduct this state verification the FDIC hires private agents at a cost of γ.
The FDIC's revenue from deposit insurance premiums, plus the assets of failed banks, may or may not be sufficient to cover its insurance payments plus its operating expenses (verification costs).
Moreover, absent aggregate uncertainty, any FDIC shortfalls or surpluses are perfectly predictable. We therefore assume that the FDIC can levy lump-sum taxes in the initial period (these taxes may be negative if the FDIC has a surplus) in order to balance its budget. We denote this lump-sum tax by τ.
Note that τ effectively represents the discounted present value of future FDIC shortfalls or surpluses.
In general it will matter who is taxed to balance the FDIC's budget. Here we assume that depositors and funded borrowers pay this tax. 15 Of course, like other agents the FDIC must transfer the funds it collects in period one into period two. How it does so will potentially matter, as FDIC actions can affect the supply of private credit. Since as a practical matter no one seems concerned that FDIC revenue collection impacts on credit availability, we make the following assumption. The FDIC deposits 14 The assumption of "one bank -one borrower" and the indivisibility of investment projects makes such a tax isomorphic to a flat rate tax on deposits. The specification in the text somewhat simplifies calculations. Parenthetically, our results would be virtually unaltered if the deposit insurer made the deposit insurance premium dependent on the bank's loan quantity (or, equivalently, its choice of strategy). We comment below on how the analysis would be affected if the government imposed such risk-based deposit insurance premia on banks. 15 Boyd, Chang and Smith (2000) analyze the consequences of alternative schemes for balancing the FDIC budget.
the proceeds of any lump-sum tax collections, and the payment of deposit insurance premiums, with private banks. This prevents FDIC revenue collection from affecting the supply of credit. In addition, the assumption implies that the FDIC is subject to the same risks as other depositors and that, in effect, it "insures itself."
Discussion
Our intention is to roughly model deposit insurance as it currently exists in the U.S. Thus we assume that the government levies deposit insurance premia in period one and accumulates a deposit insurance fund. At later dates this fund might or might not be adequate to cover FDIC losses. At present FDIC reserves are fairly high, which has led the FDIC to reduce deposit insurance premia nearly to zero.
In our model, this would correspond to a negative value for τ. However, positive values for τ are also interesting to consider. And, while the FDIC has never needed to obtain funding from general tax revenue, it clearly could do so if necessary. Indeed, such access to general tax revenue was authorized by the FDICIA Act of 1991.
The same act also provided for risk-based, rather than flat rate deposit insurance premia.
However, the assumption of a flat rate premium does little violence to current reality, as an overwhelming majority of banks have been placed in the same (lowest) risk class. Nevertheless, we analyze below how the use of risk-based premia might affect our analysis.
Finally, the assumption that the FDIC budget is balanced by imposing a lump-sum tax in the first period rather than the second is unrealistic. However, it substantially simplifies the analysis. If agents were taxed to make up FDIC shortfalls in the second period, the FDIC would have to monitor some borrowers to ascertain their ability to pay. There would also be an issue as to whether or not claims of the FDIC against bankrupt borrowers took precedence over claims of lenders. If they did, taxation by the FDIC would increase the incidence of defaults on loans. We abstract from these issues-which are of no concern in the existing discussion of deposit insurance design-by letting the government tax agents in the initial period.
II. Bank Behavior, A Partial Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we analyze the optimal behavior of banks. To do so, it is helpful to review the timing of events in the model. First, each potential banker, knowing deposit rates, taxes, and insurance premia, decides whether or not to open a bank. Potential bankers who choose not to operate banks become the depositors of other banks. Those who act as bankers invest in monitoring capacity, take deposits, and pay their deposit insurance premium. They then make a loan to one borrower. After the loan has been made, the borrower decides which project to operate among those that can be operated given his funding. Once the project choice has been made, the bank can engage in interim monitoring, as called for by the contract. A bank that has monitored will call the loan if funds have been diverted. If the investment project is not liquidated at this point, it yields a gross return z, per unit invested, drawn from the appropriate distribution. Subsequent to this realization, payments are made from the borrower to the bank, and verification of the project return is undertaken as called for by the contract. Finally, if it is feasible to do so, the bank pays r per unit deposited, and retains any residual. Otherwise the bank fails, and is taken over by the FDIC.
In keeping with the structure of commercial banking in the U. S., we assume that banks are restricted to engaging in debt contracts. Our notion of a debt contract is drawn from the CSV literature [Diamond (1984) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) , Williamson (1986 Williamson ( , 1987 It is apparent that there are only three strategies a bank can follow. (1) q τ + to a borrower, engage in no interim monitoring, and allow a diversion of funds to occur. Boyd, Chang, and Smith (1998) show that it is never optimal for a bank to follow the third strategy. We now consider the other two strategies, which we term strategies 1 and 2 respectively.
A. Strategy 1
Under strategy 1 a bank lends a borrower 1 q τ + , and engages in interim monitoring as necessary to deter moral hazard. monitoring fails to occur, the borrower gets the payoff described above. Hence, to deter misallocation of funds, a lender must choose an interim monitoring probability p to satisfy the following incentive constraint: We now describe the determination of x 1 .
Interest Rates under Credit Rationing
Under our assumptions, [Williamson (1986 [Williamson ( ), (1987 ], the function π is not monotone. In particular, even absent the moral hazard problem, excessively high rates of interest lead to high probabilities of default, high expected monitoring costs, and low returns to lenders. The presence of a moral hazard problem reinforces the negative consequences of high loan rates. 
B. Strategy 2
A bank following strategy 2 lends a borrower 2 q τ + . Funds diversion is then infeasible.
18
Therefore the borrower simply invests in a type 2 project, and interim monitoring is unnecessary.
17 When credit is rationed the analysis of a general equilibrium is somewhat easier because loan rates can be determined without reference to other endogenous variables. 18 In particular we assume that a lender can observe directly whether or not some project was undertaken.
Of course the lender cannot directly observe which project was undertaken, except by observing this ex post through the process of interim monitoring. The function ζ has properties similar to those of π. It follows that credit rationing can once again occur and, as before, we focus on economies where credit is rationed in equilibrium. Therefore, x 2 is bid up to the level that maximizes the expected return of a bank pursuing strategy 2. In particular, let 2 x denote the solution to the following problem: qx ζ .
The Cost of Funds and Net Payoffs
In order to follow strategy 2, a bank requires ( )( ) 
C. Optimality
It remains to describe when it is optimal for banks to follow strategy 1 or strategy 2. To do so, the following notation will be helpful. Let It follows from our previous discussion that banks strictly prefer strategy 1 to strategy 2 if
We now define ( )
Then it is easy to check that ( ) ητ is uniquely defined for all τ > -q 2 , and that ( ) Intuitively, a bank's cost of funds (per unit lent and in total) is higher under strategy 1 than under strategy 2. If ( ) 1 rt + is small, this higher cost will not deter banks from following strategy 1 if 12 -ππ is sufficiently high. However, as ( ) 1 rt + increases, a bank's cost of funds under strategy 1 rises relative to strategy 2. Thus, when ( ) ηητ > , strategy 2 will be followed by lenders.
In addition, it is easy to verify that ( ) ητ ′ > 0 holds. Thus the higher the lump sum tax (in effect, the larger are FDIC expected losses), the higher is the "boundary" between values of r(1 + t) where strategy 1 is optimal, and values of r(1 + t) where strategy 2 is optimal. Intuitively, when funded borrowers must pay the lump-sum tax, banks must lend more and raise more funds. This has an effect on a bank's cost of funds, and the effect is different under the two strategies. Clearly the proportional effect of a change in τ is larger under strategy 2 than strategy 1; thus the magnitude of τ affects a bank's relative ranking of the two strategies for any value of η. This effect is summarized in the function ( ) ητ .
III. General Equilibrium
There are three conditions that must be satisfied by a full general equilibrium. First, sources and uses of funds must be equal. Second, the FDIC budget must balance. And third, the assumption that β ≥ α, coupled with our focus on credit rationing implies that not all potential bankers can operate banks.
Therefore, potential bankers must earn "normal profits." We now formally describe the determination of equilibrium in this economy.
A. "Normal" Profits for Banks
As we know from the previous section, strategy 1 (2) is optimal for banks if r (1 + t) = η < (>) ( ) A potential banker who does not operate a bank will pay the lump-sum tax τ to the FDIC, and will then deposit his after-tax endowment, 1-τ , with an active bank. His second period gross income (and utility) will therefore be ( ) ( ) ( ) 1-1-/1 rt τητ =+ . It follows that potential bankers are indifferent between being bankers and depositors (banks earn "normal" profits) if (14) ( ) ( ) ( )
Qt ητητ =+ .
B. Sources Equal Uses of Funds
Let θ denote the fraction of potential borrowers who receive funding, and let ( ) With respect to sources of funds, each agent who is not a borrower or an active bank supplies one unit of funds inelastically. Since the measure of active banks must equal the measure of funded borrowers (due to our "one-bank-one borrower" assumption), sources of funds are ( )
20 Then sources and uses of funds are equal if
Note that 1 θ < must hold (credit is rationed) if ( ) ( ) 2 1-/11 q αα +< , as we henceforth assume.
C. The FDIC "Break-Even" Condition
Since αθ is the measure of active banks, and since each active bank lends ( ) , q ηττ + , the FDIC collects ( ) , tq αθηττ  +  in deposit insurance premia in period 1. In addition, the FDIC collects ( ) 1-ατ in lump-sum taxes. By assumption the FDIC redeposits this income with private banks, earning r per unit deposited in the second period. Thus total second period income-not inclusive of the assets of failed banks-equals
If η < η (τ) holds (so that banks follow strategy 1), then in the second period the rate of bank failure is G [η (q 1 + τ)/q 1 ], and the FDIC has ex post state verification costs of αθγG [η (q 1 + τ)/q 1 ]. In 20 All depositors (including potential bankers) pay a lump-sum tax to support the FDIC. Some of the savings of these agents is also used to pay deposit insurance premiums. However, the FDIC reinvests all of the funds addition, the FDIC has obligations to the depositors of failed banks that can be calculated as follows.
Each bank has an expected payment to depositors and (if it fails) to the FDIC of 
Using (16) to eliminate θ from these expressions, it is straightforward to show that the FDIC break-even requirement is
While this is by no means essential to the analysis, we henceforth take the view that the FDIC exogenously sets a value for τ the discounted present value of its future shortfalls/surpluses. Then the endogenous variables of the model can be regarded as η and the deposit insurance premium t. This method of proceeding roughly captures current practice under FDICIA, where deposit insurance premia are set as a function of FDIC reserves. However, the analysis would be essentially unaltered if we regarded the insurance premium t as the exogenous variable and τ as endogenous.
it obtains. Hence payments to the FDIC do not constitute "leakages" from the credit market. This is, in fact, the purpose of assuming that the FDIC redeposits its funds with banks.
D. Solving for an Equilibrium
To determine an equilibrium, we may proceed as follows. To begin, define µ 1 ≡ η (q 1 + τ) / q 1 and µ 2 ≡ η (q 2 + τ) / q 2 . Then substitute equation (14) into (17.a) and rearrange terms to obtain the equilibrium condition In general, there may be zero, one, or two equilibria in this economy. The possibility of multiple equilibria is illustrated in section IV below. The following proposition presents conditions under which there exists at least one equilibrium. Its proof is a minor modification of the proof of proposition 2 in Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2000) . The proposition asserts that an equilibrium will exist if the FDIC does not try to run excessively large surpluses or deficits. Not surprisingly, if the FDIC does attempt to accumulate large shortfalls or deficits, the existence of equilibrium is not guaranteed.
Similarly, it is possible to state conditions under which more than one equilibrium will exist.
The following result is proved in Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2000) .
Proposition 2. Suppose that 0 τ = (deposit insurance is actuarially fairly priced), and that When there is more than one equilibrium, the fact that ( ) ( ) ( )
Qt ητητ =+ holds in equilibrium implies that active banks and depositors have the same welfare ranking of the two equilibria.
It is not unambiguous, in general, which equilibrium banks and depositors might prefer, although below
we present examples where they prefer the equilibrium with ( ) ηητ < . Borrowers might also prefer either equilibrium. Below we present examples in which they too prefer the equilibrium with
Hence it is quite possible that our economy has two Pareto ranked equilibria.
E. A Partial Irrelevance Result
Note that the values 1 µ and 2 µ that solve (18) and (19) are independent of the value of FDIC losses, τ, and that they are determined independently of the deposit insurance premium t. In fact, the only aspect of an equilibrium that depends on any component of the deposit insurance system is the threshold value ( ) ητ that determines-given η-whether strategy 1 or strategy 2 is optimal. We now explore the implications of this observation.
Suppose that the FDIC sets some original discounted present loss value, 1 τ , and that, at this loss level, at least one equilibrium exists. Then, if the FDIC sets a new loss level 2 τ , with 21 -ττ small, there will be no change in the candidate equilibrium values 1 µ and 2 µ . Moreover, unless either
, there will be no change in the set of equilibria associated with a small change in τ.
Moreover, it is apparent from (13) . Then small changes in τ have no effect on the welfare of any agent, in equilibrium. This is also true of the associated changes in deposit insurance premia.
In short, local changes in FDIC policy are irrelevant from a welfare perspective. And, by implication, it will generally not matter whether or not there are small deviations from actuarially fair pricing of insurance or whether or not there are modest changes in the discounted present value of FDIC losses or surpluses. Of course this need not be true of sufficiently large changes in the setting of τ, as section IV illustrates.
Discussion
Our conclusion about the generic local irrelevance of FDIC policy does potentially depend on one of our maintained assumptions: that savings is inelastically supplied. While this assumption does result in considerable simplification of the analysis, it need not be innocuous. As we have noted, changes in FDIC policy affect both deposit rates of interest and the implied tax obligations of depositors. With general savings functions that depend both on rates of return and after-tax income levels, both types of changes could have effects on the supply of credit and, therefore, on credit market conditions. What types of credit market changes might result from various changes in FDIC policy would not be straightforward to determine; this would depend on both the interest and income elasticities of credit supply.
The main objective of the present study is to demonstrate the importance of studying deposit insurance in general equilibrium. Allowing for more general savings behavior could only strengthen our case that changes in FDIC policy could have quite unintended consequences. Finally, we note that our assumption of inelastically supplied savings is certainly superior to the assumption implicit in partial equilibrium analyses of deposit insurance systems; that the supply of deposits is infinitely interest elastic.
A Note on Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premia
The analysis conducted above assumed that banks face a flat-rate deposit insurance premium.
How would this analysis be altered if, instead, the FDIC levied risk-based insurance premia? The answer is, hardly at all.
Risk-based deposit insurance premia are actually easy to model. Suppose that a bank following strategy i faces a premium of t i . Moreover, define ( )
Then it is easy to verify that the values t 1 and t 2 do not enter in equations (18) and (19). They therefore do not affect the equilibrium value(s) of η. Nor do they appear in equation (14); hence they do not affect agent welfare.
These statements require one qualification, however. If, for instance, we assume that strategy 1 (2) is optimal, to check this we must verify that (12) holds (fails). But, given the way we defined η, a bank that deviates to strategy 2 (1) will pay a different deposit insurance premium, and hence will owe depositors ( ) ( ) ( ) (12): in effect this ratio will affect the "boundary" ( ) ητ dividing regions where strategy 1 and strategy 2 are optimal. Beyond this, the values t 1 and t 2 are of no consequence.
We now make two observations. First, it will generically be the case that local variations in t 1 and t 2 are irrelevant from a welfare perspective. Second, to the extent that t 1 and t 2 "matter" for anything, they matter only in the way that τ "matters" when FDIC losses are made up by imposing lump-sum taxes on depositors and funded borrowers. That is, they only affect the boundary defining the regions where strategies 1 and 2 are optimal. Thus, essentially anything that can be accomplished using risk-based deposit insurance premia can be accomplished without them by an appropriate choice of τ. This provides a strong sense in which the use of risk-based deposit insurance premia is also economically irrelevant.
F. Some Consequences of Multiple Equilibria
There are at least two interpretations that can be given to the existence of multiple equilibria.
For both it is convenient to think of an economy where the situation we have described is repeated over and over, possibly (but not necessarily) in an overlapping generations context. Under one interpretation we can imagine two intrinsically identical closed economies. One of them has an equilibrium with ( ) ηητ > bank failure rates and borrower default rates will be high (if 12x x ≤ ). In short, the economy will experience many of the symptoms of cyclical fluctuations, driven in this case by random sunspot fluctuations between multiple equilibria.
IV. Examples
In this section we consider three sets of examples. The first shows how large enough changes in FDIC losses (τ) affect various dimensions of an equilibrium, or of the set of equilibria. The second illustrates how shifts in the distribution of project returns-which can be interpreted as real shocks-affect equilibria. The third focuses on how changes in ex post monitoring costs-which can be regarded as secular changes in the severity of the CSV friction examined here-affect equilibria.
The Effects of Varying FDIC Losses
The economy 
, and 4.55 u = . Table 1 reports the consequences of varying FDIC losses (discounted to the present) from τ = 0 to τ = 0.2. As indicated there, for low values of τ there is a unique equilibrium in which banks follow strategy 2. For values of τ ≤ 0.1, increases in τ cause reductions in the rate of interest on loans (x 2 ), increases in the rate of interest on deposits, and naturally reductions in the deposit insurance premium.
Of course, as we have shown, none of these changes have any welfare consequences so long as banks continue to follow strategy 2.
For τ = 0.1, but not for τ = 0.05 or τ = 0.15, there are two equilibria. The expected utility of banks and depositors is r(1 -τ): therefore all of these agents prefer the equilibrium where banks follow strategy 1. In addition, when banks follow strategy 2, the constraint (8) binds in the problem (P.2). The analogous constraint does not bind in the problem (P.1). Thus borrowers are also better off in the equilibrium where banks follow strategy 1. Thus the two equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
For τ ≥ 0.15, there is a single equilibrium in which banks follow strategy 1. In this range increases in τ continue to increase rates of interest on deposits and to reduce rates of interest on loans.
But once again this is irrelevant from a welfare perspective.
This example illustrates an extremely important point: all agents are better off in an equilibrium where banks follow strategy 1 than they are in an equilibrium where banks follow strategy 2. In order for the former equilibrium to exist it is necessary that τ (the discounted present value of FDIC losses) be sufficiently high. Thus there is no presumption whatsoever that it is desirable for FDIC losses to be low.
Moreover, when τ = 0 there is no subsidy from the FDIC to banks: deposit insurance is priced "fairly."
Here this leads to a "bad" outcome. There is a unique equilibrium, but a Pareto superior (and unique) equilibrium could be attained by increasing FDIC losses. Thus there is also no presumption that it is desirable for the FDIC to price deposit insurance fairly.
Shifts in the Distributions of Returns
We now consider the same economy, but with two changes. First, τ is fixed at 0.1. Second, we allow z to vary between 2.9 and 3.1. Increases in z increase both the mean return and the variance of returns on projects of both types. However, they leave 12/ zz unchanged. Similarly, if
σσ is the variance of returns on type 1 (2) projects, increases in z leave 22 12 / σσ unchanged. Increases or reductions in z can be regarded as real shocks that shift the distribution of "output" in period 2. Table 2 shows how variations in z affect various aspects of an equilibrium. As is evident from the table, for low values of z there is a unique equilibrium in which banks follow strategy 2. Within such equilibria increases in z result in higher rates of interest on loans and deposits. With τ fixed, higher rates of interest on deposits reflect higher levels of depositor (and banker) expected utility. For borrowers our example has the feature that the constraint (8) always binds in the problem (P.2): thus borrower welfare is independent of z .
For z = 3 there are again two Pareto ranked equilibria. (This is identical to the previous example with τ = 0.1) For higher values of z there is a unique equilibrium where banks follow strategy 1. Here higher deposit rates of interest as z rises again translate into higher levels of (expected) utility for banks and borrowers. And, it is easy to verify that for z ≥ 3.05, higher values of z also result in higher levels of borrower expected utility.
If we consider a repeated version of our model where a value of z is drawn randomly in each period, high values of z result in a unique equilibrium where banks follow strategy 1. The higher z , the higher the expected utility of all agents. Low values of z lead to a unique equilibrium where banks follow strategy 2. The higher z , the higher the expected utility of bankers and depositors. 
Changes in Ex Post Verification Costs
The economy is as in the previous examples, except that τ is fixed at 0.1, and z is fixed at 3.0.
We now consider the consequences of allowing the ex post verification cost to vary between 0.3 and 0.7 Table 3 reports various equilibrium values for ex post monitoring costs in this range. As is apparent from the table, for low monitoring costs there is a unique equilibrium in which banks follow strategy 2. For this example, as for the others reported previously, when banks follow strategy 2 all funded borrowers obtain the expected utility level u . Thus increases in ex post verification costs affect neither borrower welfare, nor the rate of interest on loans, x 2 . However, as monitoring costs rise so too do the FDIC's costs of operation: this is reflected in the necessity of raising the deposit insurance premium along with γ in order to keep FDIC losses constant.
Lender utility is, of course, simply a monotonic function of r (1 -τ), as is the expected utility of potential bankers. Thus as γ rises from 0.3 to 0.4, the welfare of everyone other than borrowers falls.
When γ = 0.5, there are two equilibria. When banks follow strategy 1, borrower expected utility exceeds u . Thus borrowers prefer that equilibrium. So too do lenders, since r(1 -τ) is higher under "the strategy 1" than under "the strategy 2" equilibrium. As before, there are two Pareto ranked equilibria.
As γ increases further, from 0.5 to 0.6, there cease to be two equilibria. Instead there is a unique equilibrium where banks follow strategy 1. And, beyond that point, incremental increases in γ have the effect of reducing the rate of interest on both loans and deposits, and, of course, they require the FDIC to raise the deposit insurance premium. The decline in the rate of interest on loans raises the welfare of funded borrowers; the decline in the rate of interest on deposits reduces the welfare of lenders and potential bankers. Thus, for monitoring costs consistent with an equilibrium where banks follow strategy 1, increases in monitoring costs result in a redistribution that favors borrowers, as well as a higher deadweight loss due to the CSV problem.
It is clear from Table 3 that all agents would prefer to have γ = 0.5 and be in the "strategy 1 equilibrium", than to have γ = 0.4, which results in a (unique) "strategy 2 equilibrium". This illustrates another important point. Reductions in ex post verification costs increase the technical efficiency of the financial system. But, if they cause banks to switch from strategy 1 to strategy 2, such cost reductions may reduce the welfare of all agents. This is a caution against jumping to the conclusion that reductions in transactions costs are unambiguously "a good thing". Moreover, bank failure rates are unambiguously higher when γ = 0.4 than they are in "the strategy 1 equilibrium" when γ = 0.5. Thus an outside observer might see a reduction in transactions costs leading to a Pareto inferior allocation of resources, and a higher bank failure rate. Such an observer might also see the same reduction leading to the existence of smaller banks following a less sophisticated strategy for the control of moral hazard problems in lending.
V. Conclusions
We have undertaken a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs, the way in which they are priced, and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls.
Assuming that deposits are 100 percent insured (or that the government will not allow banks to fail), we have shown that the actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance may not be desirable. Nor need it be a "good" policy for the FDIC to accumulate large reserves. More generally our examples illustrate that there may be welfare gains from following policies that imply significant FDIC shortfalls when banks fail. Finally, in our model little can be accomplished by introducing risk-based pricing of deposit insurance.
We have shown that multiple equilibria can easily be observed and that, under some circumstances, these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. This multiplicity of equilibria can lead some economies to be "trapped" in equilibria with inefficient financial systems. And, in a repeated version of our model, it can give rise to business cycles driven by "sunspots." Finally, the expected magnitude of FDIC losses can affect the scope for sunspot equilibria or low level "traps" to occur.
Our most fundamental punch line is that, in studying deposit insurance arrangements, partial equilibrium analysis (and this has been the norm) is quite likely to lead to the wrong policy conclusions.
Our theoretical analysis is extremely simple and admittedly can be improved over many dimensions. But we do take account of the effect of banking policies on the equilibrium level of interest rates. We have shown that these "feedback" effects can be important and, of course, these are totally ignored in a partial equilibrium setup.
There are several directions in which the analysis could profitably be extended. We have already discussed the possibility of allowing for an elastic supply of savings. Another extension would be to consider alternative methods of funding FDIC shortfalls. The exact method by which these are financed will certainly matter in a general equilibrium context. To illustrate this point, Boyd, Chang and Smith (2000) show that, if only depositors are taxed (in the initial period) to make up FDIC deficits, all aspects of FDIC policy considered here are totally irrelevant to all aspects of an equilibrium that matter for welfare. Other FDIC funding schemes could impose taxes on depositors and funded borrowers in the second period. For the reasons discussed in section II such taxes will generally matter, and will matter in a complicated way, for the equilibria examined here. In addition, it is possible to introduce some heterogeneity into the model so that there are large and small banks that also have different probabilities of failure [see Boyd, Chang and Smith (1998) ]. In this context we could further investigate the consequences of risk-based insurance premia. And we could investigate the consequences of allowing for coinsurance with or without heterogeneity. Perhaps the answers to some of our questions will differ as we move away from complete insurance of deposits (or "too big to fail") or away from identical banks.
Nonetheless, we believe that our results illustrate the importance of analyzing deposit insurance programs in general equilibrium. 
